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Is This a Good Argument for a Finite Universe?

David Berlinksi, an agnostic philosopher and mathematician, summarizes one of the philosophical arguments for a past-finite universe as follows:

“If a series of causes do not start, it cannot get going, and if it does not get going, then there will be no intermediate causes, and if there are no intermediate causes, then over here, where we have just noticed that a blow has caused a bruise, there is no explanation for what is before our eyes.[1] Either there is a first cause or there is no cause at all, and since there are causes at work in nature, there must be a first.[2]

Essentially, the argument is that the universe must have a finite past because we experience intermediate causes, and intermediate causes would not be possible if they were not preceded by a first cause that began the whole series.

Berlinksi thinks this is a weak, but not an absurd argument. Personally, I am conflicted about its cogency. On the one hand, it does appear weak. It rests on a tautology, and begs the question. To see how, let’s put the argument in deductive form:

P1 The universe consists of a causal series of events
P2 If a causal series does not begin, it cannot get going
P3 If a causal series cannot get going, there will be no intermediate causes
P4 We experience intermediate causes
P5 Therefore a causal chain got going
P6 Therefore a causal chain began
P7 Therefore the universe began to exist in the finite past

Premise 2 is clearly a tautology. It could be restated as “only that which begins, starts,” or “only that which begins, begins.” Not only is this an unhelpful truism, but it begs the question. In saying a causal series cannot “get going” unless it “begins” is to assume from the start what needs to be proved: that the universe “got going” as opposed to “has always been going.”[3] Says who? If the universe is eternal, nothing ever “got going,” and yet, clearly, there exists a causal series that “is going.” One cannot just stipulate that a causal series cannot exist unless it had a beginning, and then conclude that since a causal series does exist, it must have begun. One must demonstrate why it is that a causal series that did not begin cannot be.[4] I think this can be done.

A causal chain must begin with a first cause to avoid the problem of the impossibility of traversing an infinite. Just as it would be impossible to reach the top step of an infinite staircase, it is impossible to traverse an infinite number of past moments to reach the present. An endless series of events, by definition, has no end, and yet today would mark the end of that series. The concept of an infinite past, then, is incoherent. The past cannot consist of an infinite number of causal events. There had to be a first cause in the finite past that caused all subsequent, intermediate causes. In other words, it is impossible for there to be intermediate causes unless they find their origin in a first cause.

While this vindicates the conclusion of the original argument, it rests on premises that are so different that it can hardly be said to be a modification of the original argument. It seems to be a separate argument altogether. In deductive form the “modified” argument would appear as follows:

P1 The universe consists of a causal series of events
P2 If the causal series is infinite, today would mark the completion of that series
P3 It is impossible to complete an infinite series of events
P4 Therefore the causal series of events had a beginning
P5 Therefore the universe began to exist in the finite past

Does this mean, then, that the original argument should be discarded? Is the tautological nature of premise 2 beyond repair, dooming the entire argument? What do you think of my criticism of the argument? What about my logic? I have been thinking and writing on this for about five hours now. The more I think about it, and the more I write about it, the murkier it gets in my mind. I would appreciate the input of someone who is taking a fresh look at this argument for their insights. Thanks!

[1]Berlinski seems to have made a mental slip in saying the “blow has caused a bruise,” for this assumes a casually-connected chain of at least two events. But according to the argument, no causal relationship can be established between any events unless there is a first cause. As the argument goes, not only would we be unable to explain the cause of the blow, but we would be unable even to say the blow was causally related to the bruise.
[2]David Berlinski, The Devil’s Delusion: Atheism and Its Scientific Pretensions (New York: Crown Forum, 2008), 68-69.
[3]Not only does premise 2 beg the question, but it stacks the deck in favor of a past-finite universe by declaring that a causal series of events, to be an actual causal series of events, must have a beginning event. This is little short of definitional fiat.
[4]It should be pointed out that the defender of an eternal universe has no explanation for the causal series. If only that which has a beginning needs a cause, and the causal series has no beginning because the universe has no beginning, then there can’t be any cause or reason for it. It’s just been going on forever, inexplicably. This is not an intellectually satisfying answer, for it goes against our causal intuitions that everything has a cause, and an infinite regression of causes is impossible. Our causal intuitions tell us the regress must stop at some ultimate cause.

We are Not Living in a Post-Modern World

These days, it is common to hear that we are living in a post-modern society. I have echoed this many times myself. William Lane Craig, however, argues that this is serious a misdiagnosis of culture. According to Craig, not only is post-modernism unlivable, but it is not the cause of the religious and moral relativism of our day. Craig argues that these phenomena are outgrowths of modernism, particularly the mid-20th century philosophy of Verificationism. Rather than living in a post-modern culture, we are living in a post-Christian culture.

Check out Craig’s comments. It’s worth the read.

How Do You Know God is Ineffable?

It has become quite common for people to assert that we cannot know anything about God, or that anything we ascribe to Him is neither true nor false, but simply meaningless. God is said to be ineffable. This assertion is often offered in the context of evangelism. In our attempt to persuade someone to become a Christian, we make certain truth-claims about God, and are met by the “God is ineffable” response, effectively shutting down the conversation. What can you say to such a person? I would suggest you ask a simple question: why? Why should we think God is ineffable? Typically, the reasons proffered will include “Because God is wholly other,” “Because God transcends language,” or “Because God surpasses human categories of thought.”

Do you notice something amiss about these responses?: They all ascribe certain characteristics to God’s nature, and these characteristics are thought to be true descriptions of God. In essence they are saying it is true that God is wholly other, and transcends human language and categories of thought, and this is why nothing can be true of God. Or similarly, they know God is wholly other, and transcends human language and categories of thought, and this is why nothing can be known of God.

This is self-refuting. They are claiming to know certain truths about God, that make it impossible to know truths about God. The advocate of an ineffable deity is left in the strange situation where he is unable to provide any reason for thinking God to be ineffable, without having to claim to know something true about Him. If the “ineffabalist” cannot provide a reason for thinking God to be ineffable without giving us true knowledge about Him, there is no reason to think God is ineffable.

How did God prevent Abimelech from sinning?

For those who believe in free will, Genesis 20:6 presents an interesting problem. Abraham was traveling in Gerar. He feared one of the inhabitants might kill him, so he could take his wife Sarah, to be his own. To spare his life Abraham lied to Abimelech, king of Gerar, saying Sarah was his sister. Abimelech took Sarah to be his wife, but he did not have sexual relations with her. In a dream, the Lord told Abimelech the truth about Sarah, and that He had prevented Abimelech from having sexual relations with her.

How is it that God prevented Abimelech from having sexual relations with Sarah? Was Abimelech denied freedom of his will? Walter Schultz, a philosopher from Northwestern College, proposed an answer to these questions in the latest volume of Philosophia Christi (Vol. 10, 2008) that I found both interesting and plausible.

Humans are free rational agents, meaning they have the freedom to choose among options apart from external constraint. They also have intentions, and initiate acts that serve to fulfill those intentions. Intentions can be either proximal, or distal. A distal intention is future-directed (e.g. an intention to vote in the next election), while a proximal intention is directed at the here-and-now (e.g. an intention to raise my arm). There is an imperceptible, but real temporal gap between an agent’s exercising of his mental power to choose X (proximal intention), and the actual execution of that choice. Furthermore, time is required both to form the intention, and to act on that intention to fulfill it.

Schultz proposes that God was able to prevent Abimelech from sinning without depriving him of his free will by intervening during the formation of his freely chosen proximal intention, interrupting the conditions necessary for Abimelech to complete his proximal intention, thereby averting the otherwise certain outcome. On this view, God intervenes after the human agent has freely chosen X, but before the effect. From the human perspective, we would consider this a case of akrasia, or weakness of will, similar to the person who says, “I always wanted to travel to Europe, but never seemed to get around to it.” The person intends to do X, but find themselves unable to do so for reasons they do not fully understand. So Abimelech freely chose to have sexual relations with Sarah, but God interrupted the completion of his proximal intention, thus aborting its effect.

What do you think about Schultz’s theory?

Differences in the Gospels II

In an earlier blog entry, "Differences in the Gospels,” I examined some supposed contradictions in the Gospels. I argued that these are not contradictions, but differences in what and how each author chose to portray the events in question, and that the only reason we find these texts problematic is because we fail to understand how ancient writers wrote. Unlike modern folks, they were not concerned with the minutiae. They were concerned with the big picture: the gist. They even felt free to report the historical facts in such a way so as to fit their literary purpose.

I gave a couple of examples to illustrate my point. In one place, John says Jesus was baptizing in Judea. A little later, however, he says it was Jesus' disciples who were doing the baptizing, not Jesus Himself. Since both statements were penned by the same author, in the same work, in close proximity, it is clear that there is no contradiction here (interestingly, if they appeared in different gospels skeptics would cite this as a contradiction). This demonstrates for us the flexibility with which the Biblical authors reported historical events. John felt free to say Jesus was baptizing in one place, even though He knew it was not Jesus Himself who was doing so. He was not lying; he was not trying to deceive; he was not mistaken. Both reports were true, even though one was more specific than the other. For John, since Jesus’ disciples were baptizing on His behalf, it was entirely legitimate to say Jesus was baptizing (we might call this “projection”). The problem is not with John, but modern readers who demand that ancient writers conform to the standards common to modern writing.

I also gave the example of John’s account of the discovery of the empty tomb. John only mentions Mary Magdalene as a witness to Jesus' resurrection (John 20:1), while the Synoptics report a plurality of women. Some point to this as a contradiction, and yet in John 20:2 John records Mary as saying to the apostles, "We do not know where they have laid him." While John only names Mary as a witness, he is clearly aware of the fact that there were more present than just Mary.

I have stumbled on a third example I would like to bring to your attention as well. According to Luke, when the women returned from Jesus’ tomb to report it empty, Peter ran to the tomb to investigate it (Luke 24:12). According to John, however, Peter and the beloved disciple both ran to investigate the tomb (John 20:3). Many skeptics point to this as a contradiction. Of course, it is obviously not a contradiction. There is nothing contradictory about Luke choosing to report only Peter’s presence, and John choosing to report Peter and the beloved disciple’s presence. One is simply an expanded, more detailed account.

What I find interesting, however, is that upon closer inspection of Luke’s gospel, it becomes clear that Luke is fully aware that Peter was not the only one who ran to Jesus’ tomb. In Luke 24:24, Luke reports the two disciples on the road to Emmaus as saying to Jesus, “And some of those who were with us went to the tomb and found it just exactly as the women also had said; but Him they did not see” (NASB). While Luke knew Peter did not go to the tomb alone, he chose only to report Peter’s involvement for His own literary purposes.

This is an example of telescoping, in which an author focuses in on certain details of the story while leaving out others. This was common for historical writers. We do ourselves a disservice if we fail to understand this, and skeptics demonstrate their ignorance of ancient writing when they use examples like this to try to undermine the reliability of the Bible. We need to guard against the temptation to impose our modern standards of historiography on ancient writers. They were not entirely concerned about quoting someone word-for-word, but sense-for-sense. They were not always concerned with reporting events in sequence, but felt free to mix them up to fit their literary purpose. They took liberties with the facts that we might not take today, but such liberties were not due to ignorance, or motivated by an intent to deceive. For them, telescoping, generalizing, extrapolating, and projecting were par for the historical and literary course. They should not be faulted for not being 21^st century Westerners. And besides, who says our literary and historiographical and literary standards are the best? Something to think about.

No Argument Provides Certainty

It is often said that science is incapable of arriving at certainty because science is based on inductive reasoning, and the conclusions we come to using inductive reasoning are probabilistic, not certain. For example, I could reason that since every crow I have ever seen has been black, that all crows are black. This is probable given our observations, but this conclusion is not certain because it is possible that there are crows of a different color that we have not yet observed.

The history of science has demonstrated just how fallible inductive reasoning is. Many scientific conclusions have proven to be wrong as new data comes to light. For this reason, science is incapable of speaking with any level of certainty to the question of God’s existence. Inductive reasoning simply cannot tell us anything conclusive about God’s existence.

Philosophy, on the other hand, works primarily on deductive reasoning, and deductive reasoning does provide us with certain conclusions. For example, I might reason that

Premise 1 Socrates is a man

Premise 2 All men are mortal

Conclusion Therefore Socrates is mortal.

The conclusion is absolutely certain. Sound philosophical arguments for God’s existence, then, can provide us with certainty about God’s existence. But do they?

While the conclusion of a valid deductive argument is certain, we can only be as certain of the conclusion as we are certain of the premises that support the conclusion. It turns out that the premises in a deductive argument are themselves derived from inductive reasoning or experience, both of which can be mistaken. In other words, deductive arguments provide sure conclusions to probable premises. In the example above, premise two is an inductive conclusion based on our experience with other humans. We have observed that all human beings are mortal, and thus conclude that all human beings are mortal. But it could be the case that there are humans who are immortal that we do not know about. Maybe they live on other planets or in another realm of reality. Granted, the chances of this are slim, but we cannot be certain. The degree to which we can be certain that Socrates is mortal, then, is the degree to which we have reason to believe all men are mortal.

So contrary to popular conception, deductive arguments do not provide certain knowledge. They may provide us with more assurance than inductive arguments, but no argument can provide us with certain knowledge. All knowledge is probabilistic in one sense or the other. While philosophical proofs for God’s existence are vastly superior to inductive proofs, neither can provide us with certainty on this important question.

Pew Forum Research into Americans Religious Beliefs

In February I blogged on the first report issued by the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life based on their expansive U.S. Religious Landscape Survey. The first report surveyed the religious affiliation of Americans. The second report, released a few weeks ago, focuses on the religious beliefs and practices of Americans, and how these relate to our social and political views.

I would highly recommend you read the 18 page summary report, if not the full 268 page report (personally I don’t have the stomach for the latter). But I would like to share some of the findings I found most interesting:

• 70% of religious Americans say many different religions lead to God. Even 57% of evangelicals hold to this view. When more than half the members of the most conservative Christian group are religious pluralists, we have serious problems on our hands. Either the exclusivity of the Gospel is not being proclaimed in churches, or not being defended.
• 78% of Americans believe in absolute moral values. This is much higher than figures posted by the Barna Research Group (22%), and is reassuring. I have to assume that such a large difference must be due to the way the question is worded in the respective surveys. I don’t know how Barna words his questions, but Pew worded theirs as follows: “There are clear and absolute standards for what is right and wrong.” The respondent was requested to rate their level of agreement with this statement. I think it is pretty straightforward. This, combined with the sheer number of participants, makes me lean toward Pew’s findings, and abandoning Barna’s as unrealistic.
• 92% of Americans believe in God. Not everyone in a religious tradition believes in the existence of God. Buddhism, for example, is typically atheistic (although strangely enough, 75% of American Buddhists believe in God). But I would expect for all of the adherents of theistic religions to believe in God. Strangely enough, they don’t. Only 99% of evangelicals do, and 97% of Catholics. The only Christian group in which everyone polled believed in God was Mormonism. Oddly enough, 21% of atheists confessed to belief in God. I’ll never figure that one out!
• 60% of adults believe God is personal; 25% believe he is an impersonal force.
• Only 3 in 4 people believe in life after death, and heaven. This was lower than I expected, especially given the number of theists in this country (92%).
• Six in ten Americans (59%) believe in hell. The gap between belief in heaven and hell has been reported to be much higher in other surveys I have read. It was interesting to see the gap between belief in heaven and hell in various religious traditions. While 95% of Mormons believe in heaven (the highest of any religious tradition), only 59% believe in hell. Jehovah’s Witnesses experience an even larger gap. Only 46% believe in heaven, but a measly 9% believe in hell (the lowest of any religious tradition—even lower than atheists!). I found this very ironic given the centrality these doctrines play in JW theology. Those who were most likely to believe in both heaven and hell were evangelicals (86% vs. 82%).
• Christianity is not the only religion in which those who profess the name often do not confess to its doctrines. Only 62% of Buddhists believe in nirvana, and only 61% of Hindus believe in reincarnation. These are staple doctrines of these religions, so we would expect a higher number of adherents to these doctrines. This goes to show that there are many cultural adherents to other religions, who either do not know the teachings of their religion, or reject them.
• 79% of Americans believe miracles occur today.
• About 40% of Americans attend religious services weekly.
• While more than twice as many people cite personal experience (34%) than religious views (14%) as the main influence on their political views, the researchers found a strong link between religious beliefs and political views.
• Only half of Evangelicals identified themselves with the Republican party.
• Those most opposed to abortion and homosexuality are Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, and evangelicals. Those least opposed are Jews, Buddhists, agnostics, and atheists.
• The more people pray, attend religious services, are certain of God’s existence, the more politically conservative they tend to be.

A Bad Argument Against Atheism

It is common to hear Christians argue against atheism on the grounds that it is impossible to prove a negative such as “God does not exist.” Only an omniscient being could do so, but an omniscient being would be God by definition! This sounds convincing, and has great rhetorical value, but it is a bad argument nonetheless.

There are a couple of glaring shortcomings. First, it is a straw-man. Most atheists do not claim to know with certainty that God does not exist. They only claim that His existence is very unlikely, or vastly improbable.

Secondly, the atheist could offer a similar argument against theism. One cannot know God exists with absolute certainty. While there may be very good grounds for thinking God exists, such knowledge is not certain. We could be mistaken (meaning it is not logically impossible for us to be wrong in this belief). In fact, virtually everything we claim to know, we know on probabilistic grounds, and yet we are justified in claiming to know it. If it would be unfair for the atheist to claim theists cannot claim to know God exists unless they have proven it impossible for God not to exist, then it is also unfair for the theist to discount atheism on the grounds that no one can be certain God does not exist. If there are good reasons for thinking His existence is unlikely, then one is justified in claiming to know God does not exist, even if they cannot be certain of this knowledge.

When you think about it, all of us claim to know certain things do not exist (unicorns, leprechauns, Santa Clause, the Greek gods, etc.) without being omniscient, and without proving their existence logically impossible. But are we certain of this? After all, we are making a claim about a negative, and it is impossible to prove a negative. The fact of the matter is that we cannot be certain that unicorns do not exist. They may exist on another planet or in another dimension that we are not aware of, and yet, given the lack of evidence for their existence we are justified in claiming to know they do not exist, even if we could be mistaken. Likewise, atheists are justified in claiming to know God does not exist, even if they cannot be certain of His non-existence. That’s not to say I think they are right, but it is to say their knowledge claim is not an illegitimate one simply because it lacks certitude. If certitude is the criterion for knowledge claims, it would make skeptics of us all.

Presbyterian Church USA to officially ordain homosexual clergy

On 6/27/08, the Presbyterian Church USA made several moves to sanction the ordination of homosexual clergy at their General Assembly. Now the measures go the 173 presbyteries for vote. It is expected that the will pass. See Albert Mohler’s discussion of this historic and lamentable event.

How Do You Know It’s Jesus You Feel in Your Heart?

When people ask Christians how we know Christianity is true, it is common for us to respond with something like, “Because I feel Jesus in my heart” or “Because I have experienced the risen Christ.” While I think faith is rational even apart from rational evidences/arguments, this sort of justification for Christian belief seems inadequate. It can always be asked how we know it was Jesus we encountered, as opposed to some other deity. Did Jesus appear to us? No. We merely had an experience that seemed undeniably supernatural in nature. So why think it was an experience with Jesus, then?

I would venture to say that we claim to have encountered Jesus because of the context in which our supernatural encounter occurred. We encountered the supernatural after having heard and believed the message of Jesus’ resurrection, and then interpret the encounter to be the result of such a belief, and confirmation that the belief is true. Hence, we say we felt Jesus in our heart, or experienced the risen Christ.

The problem is that a wide variety of religions, each with competing truth claims, profess to experience the divine. They also interpret their experience in light of the religious teaching they have been taught. They conclude that they have experienced God X, and that such an experience vindicates the truth of their religious tradition.

A religious pluralist might argue that no group experiences the deity they claim to have experienced (Jesus, Allah, Brahman, etc.). They might argue they had a genuine experience with the unknowable God, but mistakenly tried to identify Him with the God as described by their faith tradition. So when a Christian encounters God, he thinks he has encountered Jesus, and this is proof that Christianity is true. When a Muslim encounters God, he thinks he has encountered Allah, and this is proof that Islam is true. How do we respond to such an interpretation?

On one level, I agree with the religious pluralist. His explanation makes sense of the variegated inter-religious claims to have encountered with God. People actually do encounter God as he reaches out for them, but they misidentify Him because they interpret their experience of Him in light of their false religious tradition. Where I think the pluralist is mistaken is that he applies his interpretation to all religious traditions, not holding out the possibility that one faith tradition may have properly identified the God whom they have encountered.

If it is possible that one religious tradition properly identifies the God people experience, how would we know which religious tradition it was? What has been said already should highlight the problem of using religious experience as a proof for one religious tradition over another. Something more than an experience is needed to adjudicate competing religious traditions, otherwise we are left arguing in a circle. So how can we know that our interpretation of the divine is the correct one, as opposed to theirs? I would argue that we must test the various faith traditions using our rational faculties. Are they philosophically viable? Are they internally consistent? Are they confirmed/contradicted by scientific or historical data? And the list goes on. When various faith traditions are subjected to such tests, I think Christianity comes out on top as being the most viable, and that is good reason to believe the God we encountered in our experience is indeed the risen Christ.

What a Dumb Thing to Say

I take the train to work. Most days, there is a man playing the saxophone near the staircase at the depot. He always displays some sort of message to the passerbys, usually of a religious or philosophical bent, and not always profound. Today’s message struck me as particularly dumb: For every question, personal experience is the final test of truth.”

Really? I wanted to ask him if he had ever been to Naples. I would expect a negative answer, at which time I would respond, “So I assume you don’t believe Naples exists, then, right?” If personal experience is the final test for truth, and we have not experienced it, then it cannot be true. In my own life, a whole host of things cannot be true: murder, wealth, and the like. Very dumb. And yet, empiricism is how many people go about determining truth.

Deism: The Deadbeat Dad Version of Theism

Many Americans are Deists. Few would claim that title, but their view of God is deistic in either actual profession or actual behavior. They either believe in a creator God who is not involved with His creation, or they live their lives in such a way that assumes God is uninvolved with creation. So I thought I would formulate a brief definition of Deism that both defines it and criticizes it all at once. Here you go: “Deism is the deadbeat dad version of theism; the half-way house between theism and atheism for those who have enough sense to see the intellectual bankruptcy of atheism, but no tolerance for the presence of a personal God who might interfere in their personal lives.” You can quote me on that!

Oldest Church? Doubtful.

A week or so ago, it was reported that archaeologists uncovered what they believed to be the world's oldest surviving church, in Jordan. The archaeologists dated it to the 1st century, and due to a mosaic with the inscription "the 70 beloved by God and the divine" on the floor, they suggested the cave church was started by the 70 disciples of Christ who fled Jerusalem due to persecution.

I was extremely skeptical of the claim upon hearing of it. While I held out the possibility that this cave was a gathering of 1st century believers, I found it beyond belief that it was started by the 70 disciples of Christ. It appears my skepticism is warranted. National Geographic has an article detailing the counter-arguments of critics. They not only dispute the claim that this cave church was started by the 70 disciples of Christ, but that it was a first century church as well. This appears to be another instance of archaeological sensationalism.

Should We Sin Because Grace is Available?

Many holiness-minded individuals fear the doctrine of grace by faith because they think it leads to antinomianism. I have no doubt that some have used grace as a pretext for sin, but they do so without the support of Scripture. Scripture is clear that the grace that saves is the same grace that teaches us to deny ungodliness (Titus 2:12), and empowers us for holiness (Romans 6:14). To calm the minds of grace-fearers, and to correct the minds of grace-abusers, let me offer the following medical analogy.

Sin is like a cancer. It destroys the good cells in our body, and eventually leads to death. To treat this deadly disease one must undergo chemotherapy (grace). But would anyone in their right mind willingly inject their body with cancerous cells simply because a treatment for the ensuing cancer is available? Of course not! So why would anyone intentionally sin simply because grace is available to treat it? The purpose of the New Covenant was not to provide us with a license to sin, but to provide us with grace that would not only wipe away our past transgressions, but give us the power to avoid future transgressions.

Isn't it Ironic?

Isn’t it ironic that those who espouse to Darwinian evolution are also the least likely to have multiple children and most likely to support and/or obtain abortions. They are supposed to believe in survival of the fittest. Only those who reproduce stand a chance at survival, and those who reproduce the most stand the greatest chance for survival and subsequent evolution. Apparently Darwinian liberals are not fit to survive!

In all seriousness, I think this reveals the cognitive dissonance of liberals. They cannot consistently live out their worldview. In fact, given the maxim that people behave in accordance with their beliefs, I tend to think most adherents of Darwinism do not really believe it. They may give intellectual assent to it, but they don’t live it. All that matters is that God is out of the picture.

Not true that 1 in 4 teenage girls has an STD

Some of you might have heard recently a statistic released by the CDC that 1 in 4 teenage girls has an STD. Many people were skeptical of this statistic when it was released. Come to find out, there is good reason for that skepticism. See this article for more information.

Atheism is Driven by the Will, not the Intellect

In his 1986 book, The Blind Watchmaker, Richard Dawkins said “Darwin made it possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist.” I have quoted Dawkins many times, but until it was brought to my attention recently, I never recognized the glaring—albeit implicit—admission he makes about atheism. To say Darwin made it possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist would mean the rejection of God’s existence came before there was sufficient reason to think it possible that God did not exist. Prior to Darwin, one’s commitment to atheism was a commitment of the will, not a commitment of the mind based on evidence. Only after Darwin could account for the apparent design of the universe in purely material terms could atheism be taken seriously.

Unbeknownst to Dawkins, he testifies to the truth of Romans 1 in two ways. First, creation reveals the Creator, and the appearance of design cries out for a Designer. The revelation of creation is so clear that those who rejected it prior to Darwin did so only to the detriment of their own intellectual honesty, for while they could not explain the existence and form of the universe without God, they rejected Him anyway.

Second, as Paul said, people already know God, but suppress that knowledge because their deeds are evil. Atheists are not being intellectually honest with themselves when it comes to the question of God’s existence. Atheism is a commitment of the will in search of justification, no matter how weak that justification may be. Darwinian evolution is a case in point.

Deep Thoughts

Philosopher Alexander Pruss has been sharing some "Deep Thoughts" over at his blog. Here were my favorites:

The past is over.
The future has not yet come.
What was will never not have been.
Impossible things don't happen.

Don't you love tautologies?

Do You Take the Bible Literally?

When someone asks you if you take the Bible literally, what they usually mean is do you take the Bible seriously? They want to know if you believe all that “crazy stuff” about talking snakes and resurrected messiahs.

Greg Koukl suggests that when someone asks if you take the Bible literally, do not respond with a simple “yes” answer. It is too ambiguous, and open to misinterpretation. Respond, “I take it in the sense the author intended it.” Then, you might expand a little bit to say, “If he meant it in a literal sense, I take it in a literal sense. If he meant it in a metaphorical sense, I interpret it accordingly, in an attempt to uncover the literal truth intended by the metaphor.” This is the same way we interpret all communication.

Halfway to Euthanasia in CA?

Not good. An underhanded attempt to legalize euthanasia in CA has passed the House, and now goes to the Senate where it will probably be approved as well. The governor is likely to sign the bill.

Essentially the bill requires that doctors advise terminally ill patients with a life expectancy of one year or less, how they can be placed into a drug-induced coma and then dehydrated to death. If a physician is unwilling to advise their patient of this option, they must refer them to a physician who will. Go here for more details.

This is a half-step towards assisted suicide or euthanasia in this state.

Is Belief in God Rational?

Atheists, and unfortunately even some theists, think belief in God is irrational. I beg to differ. Given the maxim that effects require an adequate cause, and no effect can cause itself, theism makes the best sense of the world. The beginning of the universe (effect) begs for a Beginner (cause), the design of the universe (effect) begs for a designer (cause), and the moral law we intuit (effect) begs for a moral law giver (cause).

Indeed, theism is much more reasonable than atheism. Is it more rational to believe the universe popped into existence out of nowhere completely uncaused, or that it was caused by a powerful and intelligent mind? Is it more rational to believe the intricate design and incomprehensibly balanced fine tuning of our universe happened by chance, or that an intelligent agent designed it for a purpose? Is it more rational to believe moral values exist inexplicably or as the result of evolution, or that they are the product of a moral law giver? In each case, the latter seems to be the more reasonable position prima facie. The only reason to deny these conclusions would be if atheists could provide good evidence that would overwhelm our prima facie intuitions. Not surprisingly, they have not done so.

Apologetics is a Person-Specific Enterprise

Apologetics is a person-specific enterprise. We are not trying to convince some generic Joe Blow, but specific individuals we encounter. Our apologetic should be tailored to meet the needs of the person we are dialoguing with.

For example, when someone tells you they don’t believe in God, the first thing you might do is ask them why. Their answer will help you to better direct your response. If the lone reason they reject the existence of God is because of the problem of evil, it won’t do much good to hit them with every offensive apologetic argument for God’s existence, beginning with a cosmological argument. No. You need to go straight to a defensive apologetic, showing the logical consistency between theism and the existence of evil.

If the reason they do not believe in God is because they do not believe there is any evidence for God’s existence, the first thing you should do is ask them what sort of evidence they are willing to accept. For example, the atheist might respond that he would believe in God if you could show Darwinian evolution to be false. In such a case your apologetic to this individual would revolve around this issue, as well as general science and faith issues.

Such a question also prevents you from running into the situation in which you offer argument after argument, while the atheist just folds his arms in response each time, saying, “I’m not convinced.” What you’ll find is that some atheists are not prepared to accept any sort of evidence for God’s existence, because they have unreasonably high expectations of what constitutes evidence. What they want is evidence that carries with it “absolute certainty” of its truth. This standard is too high, and unfair. Most of what we believe to be true we believe without absolute certainty. There is no reason to hold belief in God to a higher standard. Belief in God is warranted if His existence is more likely than not, given the evidence. Probing the atheist in this way will help you set reasonable expectations.

Even Pro-Gay Advocates Can See Why Same-Sex Marriage is Bad for Society

In an article published yesterday at Townhall, Frank Turek writes about same-sex marriage and how it will affect society. Not only did Frank advance a nearly-identical argument to the one I have been advancing here on this blog (a secular, rather than religious argument), but he brought to my attention a pro-homosexual advocate who has written a book opposing same-sex marriage for many of the same reasons.

In his book, The Future of Marriage, David Blankenhorn argues that “Across history and cultures . . . marriage’s single most fundamental idea is that every child needs a mother and a father. Changing marriage to accommodate same-sex couples would nullify this principle in culture and in law.” Blankenhorn sees this as a problem.

Why? It’s not because people will stop having children. It’s because the parents will not be tied to the children as they are in a marriage. Dissolution rates of non-married parents are 2-3 times greater than married parents. And the social ills resulting from broken families are enormous.

I couldn’t agree more. And I am glad that a pro-gay Democrat is making this argument. It shows that one does not need to be religious or morally conservative to see why same-sex marriage is not good for society. Marriage is about children, but same-sex relationships are not about children: they are about the couple themselves.

Blankenhorn recognizes that there is a difference between allowing homosexuals to engage in homosex and establish lasting relationships with each other, and officially recognizing those relationships as an example of marriage.

Here’s a couple of quote-worthy statements from Turek. Turek on why the legal recognition of same-sex couples is detrimental to the institution of marriage:

“There’s no question that liberalized marriage laws will help change our attitudes and behaviors about the purpose of marriage. The law is a great teacher, and if same-sex marriage advocates have their way, children will be expelled from the lesson on marriage.”

Turek on the notion that marriage is not about children:

“Well, if marriage isn’t about children, what institution is about children? And if we’re going to redefine marriage into mere coupling, then why should the state endorse same-sex marriage at all? Contrary to what homosexual activists assume, the state doesn’t endorse marriage because people have feelings for one another. The state endorses marriage primarily because of what marriage does for children and in turn society. Society gets no benefit by redefining marriage to include homosexual relationships, only harm as the connection to illegitimacy shows. But the very future of children and a civilized society depends on stable marriages between men and women. That’s why, regardless of what you think about homosexuality, the two types of relationships should never be legally equated.”

Worldview, not Religion

I am told that Christian apologist, Os Guinness, thinks we should replace religion-speak with worldview-speak in the public square. The reason? Religion is something you may or may not have, but everyone has a worldview. Some worldviews simply have a supernatural element to them while others do not.

The advantage of worldview-speak over religion-speak is that it prevents non-religious folks from claiming the high ground of rational neutrality; as though we are hopelessly biased by our religious presuppositions, but they remain objective. Are religious people biased? Of course, but so are non-religious (secular) folks. No one is epistemologically neutral. We all bring certain presuppositions to the task of knowing, and use them to interpret the world. Having a religious worldview makes us no less objective than those with a secular worldview. We can no more dispense with our worldview than can the secularist, and indeed, we need not do so. While it is wise to consider a question from the perspective of a worldview different than your own, we are not required to do so in order to be rational.

I think Mr. Guinness is onto something.